ratives that inhere in very ordinary landscapes. Instead of emphasizing closure and unity, opening involves the ongoing processes of narrative production. In effect it engages the practices of how people make places and stories a constitutive part of their own experience, interpretation, and memory.

REPRESENTATION AND LANDSCAPE (1992)
JAMES CORNER

A central characteristic of the often ambiguous term "landscape" is that it is first a schema, a representation, a way of seeing the external world, and, based on one's point of view, such schemata vary significantly. Geographers and painters see the land in different ways, as do developers and environmentalists. If asked to draw the landscape, each party would no doubt produce a wholesome variety of graphic models and representations, reflecting their own peculiar mode of (re)cognition. Drawings might range from a cartographer's map, to an ecologist's transect, to an artist's perspective rendering. A poet might prefer words and tropes to visual images when describing a landscape. Collectively, each of these texts would "draw out" of an existing landscape a particular description, or analytique, as seen through a specific conceptual lens, and would subsequently alter or transform the meaning of that landscape. Landscapes are thus the inevitable result of cultural interpretation and the accumulation of representational sediments over time; they are thereby made distinct from "wildernesses" as they are constructed, or layered.

From a landscape architectural point of view, a major aspect of landscape is that it is not only a phenomenon of analysis, but is more significantly something to be made, or designed. The landscape architect is very much interested in physically manipulating the land to reflect and express human ideas about Nature and dwelling therein. After all, landscape architecture is not simply an ameliorative or restorative practice, but is more precisely a figurative and representational art, providing culture with a sense of existential orientation through the construction of a built symbolic environment. Like any text, landscape architecture is conceptual, schematizing Nature and humankind's place within it, but at the same time it differs from other landscape representations in that it operates through and within the medium of landscape itself. In other words, the actual lived landscape is the medium of both construal and construction; the representation is not only encoded in various related textual media, such as literature or painting, but is more significantly embodied in the constructed landscape. As such, landscape architectural drawing—a textual medium which is secondary to the actual landscape—can never be simply and alone a case of reflection and analysis; it is more fundamentally an eidetic and generative activity, one where the drawing acts as a producing agent or ideational catalyst.

The relationship of drawing to the production of the built landscapes remains, however, obscure. Indeed, this obscurity is made all the more difficult to understand when one stops to reflect on just why drawings have become so extensive and prevalent in the mak-
ing of landscapes: do not drawings seem particularly abstract phenomena when compared with the phenomena of landscape? This peculiarity is made all the more apparent when one compares drawing in landscape architectural production with other modes of artistic endeavor, such as painting or sculpture. It is not insignificant that many painters and sculptors often admit to not knowing where they are going with their work when they first begin. Instead, the work "unfolds" as the artist is personally engaged with the medium and the possibilities that emerge from the work. Invariably, the fine artist's most focused attention is on the making, the touching and holding of the same worked artifact that will become the final piece. During the time of engagement there occurs a spontaneity of feeling and expression arising both from a reactive response to the medium and from an imaginative source deep within. Here, the body and the imaginal are joined, inextricably involved with one another in a concentrated and creative, yet unselfconscious, unity. The making is itself a dialogue, a perceptive conversation between the medium and the imagination that cannot be intellectualized or thought of external to experience.

The ancient Greeks knew this; an important connotation of poiesis, meaning to create or to make, is that only through the sentient perception of tactile and creative activity—the actual work of making—can discovery and revelation occur, the longed-for "moment" of disclosure. As Heidegger has recognized, the hidden "truth" of things, their essence or aletheia, is something brought forth through human agency.

The difficulty in landscape architecture, however, is that the actual work of building and construction is usually done by people other that the landscape architect. The instrumentality of modern construction procedures leaves little room for emotive or tactile involvement. Unlike the painter, the musician, the sculptor, or the traditional gardener, the landscape architect rarely has the opportunity to significantly touch and mould the landscape medium as it plays out in response to intervention. Although landscapists ultimately make places out of plants, earth, water, stone and light, they are caught at a peculiar distance from these same elements, working instead with a completely different medium, an intermediary and translatory medium that we call drawing. Creative access to the actual landscape is therefore remote and indirect, masked by a two-dimensional screen.

This problem of distance and indirectness is further complicated by the apparent disparity or incongruity between drawing and landscape. While the preliminary sketch bears an obvious and similar relationship to the work of painting and sculpture, a drawing, any drawing, is radically dissimilar from the medium that constitutes the lived landscape. The disparity between the phenomenon of drawing and that of the landscape means that there is often a discrepancy between what is represented and what gets built. It is significant—but not necessarily disadvantageous—that the nature and embodied meanings of drawings and landscapes belong to different worlds, as do their modes of experience.

Drawing in landscape architectural design is also different from the art of the landscape painter. In a brilliant essay called "Translations from Drawing to Building," Robin Evans has described how architectural design drawing differs from other pictorial artist in that it is not done after the subject, but prior to it, that is, prior to building and construction. Landscape architectural drawing is not so much an outcome of reflection on a pre-existing reality, as it is productive of a reality that will later emerge. The built landscape must be determined in advance, and will exist after the drawing, not before it.

Therefore, as a preface to the argument that follows, it is possible to state that the difficulties of drawing, with respect to landscape architectural production, lie primarily in three
characteristics: (1) the designer's indirect and detached, or remote, access to the landscape medium; (2) the incongruity of drawing with respect to its subject—its abstractness with respect to actual landscape experience; and (3) the anterior, prevenient function of the drawing—its generative role. Paradoxically it is these same three characteristics that make such drawing enigmatic in both a negative and positive sense. On the one hand, the drawing can be an impotent imposter, an impossible analog, dangerously reductive and misused; whereas, on the other hand, drawing holds the possibility of forming a field of revelation, prompting one to figure previously unforeseen landscapes of a richer and more meaningful dimension....

THE MEDIUM OF LANDSCAPE

The landscape is primarily a medium that is irreducibly rich in sensual and phenomenological terms. Traditionally, the landscape has provided a great experiential quarry from which a variety of ideas and metaphors have inspired artistic and cultural attitudes toward Nature since antiquity. As a medium of symbolic representation, the landscape and its constitutive elements—stones, plants, water, earth, and sky—when artfully composed—have provided humans with some of the most sacred and powerful places of embodied meaning. Nothing, and certainly not a picture, can replace or equal the direct and bodily experience of such places. In particular, there are three phenomena unique to the medium of landscape and the experience of the same that evade reproduction in other art forms and pose the greatest difficulty for landscape architectural drawing. These may be tentatively called landscape spatiality, landscape temporality, and landscape materiality.

SPATIALITY IN LANDSCAPE

Unlike paintings or novels, there is very little opportunity to wander or turn away from the experience of landscape. Spatially, it is all-enveloping and surrounds us, flooded with light and atmosphere. Irreducible, the landscape controls our experience extensively; it permeates our memories and consciousness, and enframes our daily lives. Not only does the landscape surround us, but it does so in a limitless way. Its scale is big. Scale refers to both size and measurement, but more directly it denotes the relative size of something, the relative extent or degree. When people normally speak of landscape scale, they are referring to its bigness, its enormity relative to themselves. The limitless immensity of the landscape is felt to be spacious, sweeping, vast, enveloping and engaging of the subject. Scale engages not because it is an object—something external—but rather because it is a phenomenon that penetrates our imaginary consciousness. Bachelard has written of this experience, distinguishing the "immediate immensity" of the world, the apparent limitlessness of the great forests and oceans, from the "inner immensity" of the human imagination, the inner space of the self, infinite and luminous. Bachelard has speculated that the vast world of external Nature invokes a primal response within the subject, calming the soul and distilling a paradoxical though comforting sense of "intimate immensity" with the world. A dream-space of infinite magnitude opens wherein vast thought and imaginative extension are reciprocally engaged with the spatial corporeality of landscape. Landscape scale not only envelopes the body but also the imagination and the spirit.

This all-enveloping nature of landscape space, its overriding bigness and sheer sense
of scale, and its inevitable correspondence with the poetic imagination are peculiar to the landscape medium. The full plenitude of landscape spatial experience cannot be represented without alteration or reduction: it can neither be drawn, for it is not in essence pictorial, nor can it be quantified, without gross simplification, for it is not all-measurable.

Furthermore, landscape space is a highly situated phenomenon, literally bound into geographical places and topographies. The spatial interrelationships of cultural and natural patterns that constitute a particular landscape mean that places are interwoven as a densely contextual and cumulative weave. Every place is unique and special, nested within a particular topos, or “topography.” For the ancient Greeks, topos referred to a tangible place that immediately brought to mind a variety of associations. Places, like things, conjure up a wealth of images and ideas; we place topics and rhetorical arguments as much as we do topography and space. We always find ourselves inextricably caught up with and bound into places. Our knowledge and experience of space is therefore more ontological, or "lived," than it is mathematical or Cartesian. Heidegger recognized the situatedness of space when he wrote:

Space is in essence that for which room has been made, that which is let into its bounds. That for which room is made is always granted and hence is joined, that is, gathered, by virtue of a location...Accordingly, spaces receive their being from locations and not from "space." 9

Locations "gather" and interconnect phenomena; they "admit and install" relationships to become "places." "Space is not the setting (real or logical) in which things are arranged, but the means whereby the position of things become possible," wrote Merleau-Ponty, describing how space is the "universal power" that enables things to be connected, and is fully dependent on the subject's ability to experience and move through it. 10 As such, each of us "spaces" the world around us. Through spacing we orient ourselves and construct our geographical being.

Spacing also implies a conceptual ability to "think across" space. As Heidegger has shown, thinking can "persist through" distance and time to any thing or place. 12 When one moves through landscape space, that person is going "somewhere," he/she has a destination, and, in a phenomenological sense, part of the individual is already there, occupying, thinking, pervading.

The subject in the landscape is therefore a fully enveloped and integral part of spatial and phenomenological relations. The experience of landscape space is never simply and alone an aesthetic one but is more deeply experienced as a lived-upon topological field, a highly situated network of relationships and associations that is perhaps best represented as a geographical map of collagic dimensions. The topological experience of landscape obviously challenges the spatial instrumentality of Cartesian geometry and algebraic measurement that is so prevalent in the most contemporary representations of space. The Cartesian co-ordinates that constitute purely technical projection drawing neither originate nor end in earthy space—they are not situated in place but float in an abstract frame of analytic-mathematical relations.

TEMPORALITY IN LANDSCAPE

Meaning, as embodied in landscape, is also experienced temporally. There is a duration of experience, a serialistic and unfolding flow of befores and afters. Just as a landscape cannot
spatially be reduced to a single point of view, it cannot be frozen as a single moment in time. The geography of a place becomes known to us through an accumulation of fragments, detours and incidents that sediment meaning, "adding up" over time. Where, when, and how one experiences a landscape precipitates any meaning that is derived from it.

Moreover, as Merleau-Ponty has identified, there are no events without someone to which they happen. He has written: "Time is not a real process, not an actual succession that I am content to record. It arises from my relation to things... Let us not say that time is a 'datum of consciousness;' let us be more precise and say that consciousness deploys or constitutes time."13

The disclosure of meaning in a given landscape can only occur when the subject is present, moving through it, open to sensation and experience. This phenomenological observation not only means that one's comprehension of landscape is bound to a particular cultural view. Such are the periods that constitute history. We today "see" Versailles differently from the seventeenth-century courtiers and festival-goers, for example.

Temporality in landscape experience is further complicated by the movement of the body itself, a phenomenon we call kinethesis. When moving across landscape space there is not only a dynamic flow of perceptions derived from external sources, but there is also the muscular and nervous movement of the body itself through space and time.14 One may run, stroll, dance or ramble across, down or along a landscape, changing relational meanings through the pace and nature of bodily movement. This is further complicated by the fact that moving bodies in the landscape are often in a distracted state, the individual paying little, if any, concentrated attention to their immediate environment. We rarely pay such conscious and sensorial devotion to landscape space as we do in a painting or an object. Rather, as Walter Benjamin has recognized, the meaning derived from landscape and architectural space is received "by a collectivity in a state of distraction," slowly appreciating its symbolic environment through "habitual appropriation," or through every day use and activity.15 The experience of landscape takes time-, and results from an accumulation of often distracted events and everyday encounters.

A third aspect of temporality in landscape distinguishes it from buildings and other spatial artforms: landscape is a living biome that is subject to flux and change by natural processes operating over time. The dynamic action of erosion, deposition and the effects of growth and weather continually transform the structure and pattern of the shifting landscape. The same landscape may be experienced in radically different ways when it is in flood, engulfed in fog, covered with snow, or burning with fire, meaning that the qualities of space, light, texture, and ambience are ever subject to change. Not only does this dynamism challenge the art and intentionality of landscape architectural meaning (because of the impermanence of a medium caught in flux), but it also makes it difficult, if not impossible, to represent and experience it externally, as through a drawing for example.

SUBSTANCE AND MATERIALITY IN LANDSCAPE

The landscape is further complicated because it is a concrete and substantial medium, composed of elemental matter. Matter is the raw, brutish stuff from which things are made. It is what constitutes material properties, making them perceptible to our senses. Materiality is the quality of being material and is best understood through the tactile and bodily perception of things, senses distinct from any form of secondary or objective deduction.
The tactile not only includes surface phenomena, such as roughness and smoothness, stickiness and silkiness, but also substantial phenomena such as density and viscosity, elasticity and plasticity, hardness and rigidity. Materials in the landscape radiate a host of sensory stimuli that are deeply registered by the sentient body: the aroma of material; the feeling of humidity or dampness; the intensity of light, dark, heat and cold. Different woods burn in different ways. They give off varying flame patterns—some crackle, some hiss, their embers may glow, sparkle, or smoke. As living trees, the same woods are known to us in significantly different ways. In the pine stand the wind whispers and whistles; in the gnarled oak forest it broods and wallows; in the aspen grove it rustles. Things and places become known to us because of what they impart to our senses through the very organization of their sensible aspects. The significance of anything encircles and permeates tangible matter.

Today's fascination with the visual image, the pictorial, makes it all the more important to recall how the greater part of landscape experience belongs to the sensorium of the tactile, the poetries of material and touch. A bogland for example can be quite monotonous or uninteresting visually, but it can be appreciated completely different way through bodily and tactile experience—the muttering squelch and lisp of water underfoot; the springy return of the spongy ground; the dampness of cold, gray, windless air; the peaceful softness of it all. Obviously, drawing is as limited here as it is in the realms of space and time. While a drawing can perhaps signify qualities, it cannot reproduce or represent the actual qualitative experience of materials which constitute the tactile landscape.

Thus, the phenomenological qualities of landscape space, time and material present unsurmountable difficulties for drawing and representation. First, the flatness and framing of the graphic presentation fails to capture the all-enveloping quality and sheer scale of landscape space. What is presented is a picture, a flat frontality approached from a distance as an object. Second, the drawing is autonomous, equally at home in a gallery or book. It is not situated as are places and locations, and remains unaltered when estranged from the complexity of life-situations. Third, the drawing is static and immediate, meaning that it is quickly decoded as the eye scans the image from a totalizing and singular point of view. Landscape experience, meanwhile, is received in moments, glances, and accidental detours, kinesthetically unfolding through rambling and habitual encounters over time. Fourth, a drawing is made of its own materials—it has its own substance, and is therefore unable to reproduce and actualize the sensuous and tactile experience of the corporeal landscape, even though a drawing may oftentimes possess the power to make humans more cognizant of a landscape's attributes. Fifth, and perhaps most significantly, the drawing is experienced optically, with rapt and full attention being paid to the image, whereas landscape is so much more, experienced as much if not more through the body than the eye. The subject in the landscape is a fully enveloped and integral part of spatial, temporal, and material relations, and nothing can reproduce the meaning that comes from this lived experience, no matter how accurate or skilful is the representation in other mediums.16

THE MEDIUM OF DRAWING: PROJECTION, NOTATION, AND REPRESENTATION

The phenomenology of landscape experience eludes drawing to such a point that one might feel the need to end the discussion at this point, perhaps doubting or at best wondering how drawings can relate to landscape at all. Yet useful and imaginative relationships have
evolved over the centuries (no matter how partial or indirect these may at first seem). Landscape and architectural drawing can be discussed as three quite distinct and separate types. We shall call them projection, notation, and representation.

**Projection**

Projection has to do with *direct analogies* between drawing and construction, and includes the plan, the elevation, the section, the axonometric, and, in a lesser way, the perspective. In *Natural History*, Pliny the Elder offered one myth of the origin of drawing when he told of the story of Diboutades tracing the shadow of her departing lover on the wall.17 Robin Evans has beautifully compared David Allan's painting of Pliny's tale, entitled *The Origin of Painting*, of 1773, with the architect Frederick Schinkel's painting of the same title, done in 1830.18 In both, light rays project the shadow of a figure onto the flat wall and constitute a traced outline which may be called a "projection." A shape is projected through space to be captured on a flat picture plane. Evans has described how, in Allan's depiction, the projected drawing was the outcome of a single-point light source casting the shadow of the seated lover onto a refined interior wall, whereas in Schinkel's painting, a man better known as an architect than a painter, the drawing was the result of solar illumination (and therefore the result of parallel projection), casting the shadow of a figure onto an uncut stone. For the architect, therefore, the projection drawing serves as a precedent to artifice, acting as a template of transfer from figure to cut-stone, or more precisely, from *idea* to built artifice.

The projection drawing is thus directly analogous to construction. One constructs a drawing as one does a building. Both are "projects." A drawing that surveys and measures an existing landscape is a literal projection of that topography onto the picture-plane. On the other hand a drawing that proposes a new and as yet unrealized landscape acts as the mediator between the designer's vision, or ideational project, and the actual construction of that project on the site. The survey drawing is projected from the ground, whereas the construction drawing is projected onto the ground. Both types of drawing are demonstrative as they reveal otherwise hidden aspects of the building or landscape. A plan, or a map for example, makes visible an aerial topography that is otherwise inaccessible.

For Vitruvius, the parts of a construction were arranged according to the "ideas of disposition," which were constituted in three ways: *ichnographia*, the plan; *orthographia*, the elevation; and *scaenographia*, the sectional profile.19 These drawings embodied in themselves the "ideas" necessary for architectural translation and construction. Thus, the plan drawing literally demonstrates the layout and organization on the ground, akin to the marking and pegging out of a foundation: the elevation drawing demonstrates the raising and construction of a vertical face, akin to scaffolding; the section or profile-cut demonstrates the details and relations between parts; and the sectional linear perspective allows for the optical correction of proportion and scale.20 The Vitruvian "ideas" were less graphic conventions than conceptual strategies analogous to the reality of execution. Another projection, which is more peculiar to landscape and gardens, is the planometric, probably first devised by the ancient Egyptians and developed during medieval times. Here, the vertical elements of a building or garden are "laid down," as in elevation over the plan. This "double" projection embodies both the map-like topography of landscape terrain, as seen from above, and the frontal, or elevational, composition as seen by the standing subject, and it demonstrates to the gardener the layout and distribution of the various plant forms as well as the relationships between the parts. Unlike buildings, which are raised volumetrically as floors,
walls and roofs, the construction of a landscape is much akin to the workings of the planometric, emphasizing both the ground plane and the frontal identities simultaneously.

Danielle Barbara, commenting on Vitruvius's Treatise in 1569, believed the projection geometries of plan, section and elevation to be superior to perspective, making a clear distinction between "ideas" and "expression on the paper." Projective drawings are neither a picture nor a neutral set of information, rather they embody in themselves architectural ideas through co-similar and complementary projections which are ontologically conceived as being analogous to the symbolic intentions of the built work itself. This practical relationship has largely been forgotten today, displaced by a more instrumental and descriptive use of projective geometry. Alberto Perez-Gomez has described how, during most of the seventeenth century, architects could still distinguish between ontological drawing and illusionary drawing, i.e., between "practical" drawing and artificial perspective. Describ-
ing the degeneration of eidetic projective drawing into the functional and systematic methodology developed at the Ecole Polytechnique in Paris, Perez-Gomez has written: "The original architectural 'ideas' were transformed into universal projections that could then, and only then, be perceived as reductions of buildings, creating the illusion of drawing as a neutral tool that communicates unambiguous information like scientific prose."\(^22\)

In other words, the power of demonstrative drawing lies in the fact that it is open to interpretation, both prior to and after the built construct. Such drawing is an integral part of the whole artistic "project," making visible what is hidden and prompting one to understand something at a higher level. One attribute of William Kent's oeuvre of drawings, for example, or of Bernard Tschumi's portfolio for the Parc de la Villette, is that the images significantly affect the way one sees and understands the landscape to which they refer. Never is drawing merely a mute and instrumental document. However the purely procedural techniques of modern-day projection drawings tend to alienate both designer and builder from a synesthetic and hermeneutical mode of making and knowing. From the eighteenth-century pattern books of Batty Langley, replete with a menu of geometrical templates for garden layout and design, to the current-day wide acceptance of "graphic standards" and glossaries of forms and "types," projective drawing has degenerated into a prescriptive recipe for relatively harmless, but thoughtless and trivial production. The contemporary belief that drawings are either objective communicative devises (instrumental construction drawings) or illustrations (facile presentation drawings) significantly misunderstands the traditional symbolic and ontological basis of projection.\(^23\)

**Notation**

Some systems of standard projection belong to a family of drawing called notation. Notation systems seek to identify the parts of a schema, enabling them to be reproduced, enacted or performed. They include itinerary schedules, piano scores and dance notations. Measured plans, sections, elevations, and written specifications are also notational, as their main purpose is to specify the essential properties of a particular work in order for it to be translated with minimum ambiguity. In *Languages of Art*, Nelson Goodman has written that notation schemes must employ a symbol system that is "syntactically differentiated within unambiguous and finite parameters."\(^24\) Notations are therefore strictly denotive constructs rather than connotative ones. Edward Tufte has remarked that "Design strategies for recording dance movements encompass many … display techniques: small multiples, close text-figure integration, parallel sequences, details and panorama, a polyphony of layering and separation, data compression into content-focused dimensions, and avoidance of redundancy."\(^23\) The unambiguous nature of the notation is an attempt to avoid connotative or subjective misinterpretation—even though the playing of a musical score, for example—is still open to interpretation by the musician. Obviously, the quest for strictly denotive objectivity remains a fundamental principle for notational work, but, at the same time, we cannot forget that interpretative semiosis remains an inevitable part of notational reading, even though the tolerance of variation may be small.

Notation systems in landscape architectural design are not only useful for their communicative and translatory status, but also because they enable one to consider the simultaneity of different layers of experience, including movement and time. Rudolf Laban, for example, developed a system of dance notation called *Labanotation*, which precisely choreographs the movement of the body through time and space, enabling dancers to enact a
particular performance.\textsuperscript{26} It successfully challenges the view that complex motion is too difficult a subject-matter for notational articulation through a layered deployment of abstract symbols and encodings. The landscape architect Lawrence Halprin has also devised notational scores to design and coordinate fountain displays as well as to consider the disposition and experience of elements along a particular route or sequence. Halprin also developed a method of "scoring" that enabled group participation in decision making and planning. The complicated, but highly active, score itself becomes a performed piece as the creative process is graphically played out.\textsuperscript{27} Apart from Halprin, however, notational developments specific to landscape architecture have been few and far between, and yet the analogous qualities of landscape to narrative, dance, theater, or film, suggest that notations would be a promising area of research. One might begin by studying the theatrical scores developed by Moholy-Nagy or the film storyboards of Sergei Eisenstein, who effectively separated the various layers of cinematic experience in order to coordinate the movements of the camera with the playing of the soundtrack, the dimming and brightening of light, and the timing of editing and cutting. Eisenstein called the intersection of the various layers "correspondences," explaining how the full meaning embodied in the film would be
a result of their simultaneous correspondence—an overlay known as montage. Bernard Tschumi adopted a similar strategy, layering spatial, temporal, and material phenomena into a notational sequence for a "cinematic path" at the Parc de la Villette. The notation successfully plays down visual aspects of the experience while highlighting programmatic and spatial ones.

Such notations afford a coded matrix upon which to design narratives of time and space, enabling one to orchestrate the simultaneity of spatial, temporal and tactile experience. However, these syntactically complicated graphics remain limited because of the need for specialist reading to decode the complex score and understand it as experience. How many of us can actually hear the music where we read a piano score, or experience a movie sequence from looking at a storyboard? On the other hand, notations cannot, nor should they necessarily try to, portray or depict experience; their function is simply to identify the parts which constitute it.

**Representation**

Unlike projection and notation, representational drawings aim to represent a given landscape or building, seeking to elicit the same experiential effects but in a different medium—to give the same effects again. Pictorial perspective is therefore a representation in this sense as it depicts the depth and spatiality of a scene at eye-level from a certain vantage point. An accurate perspective structure, with carefully observed and applied chiaroscuro, texture and color, will closely resemble and imitate a particular scene, as if drawn on a pane of glass positioned between the viewing subject and the landscape. Constable, for example, strove to capture in his painting the "truth" of a scene, recording the landscape before his eyes with an almost scientific precision and discipline. With equal if not more emphasis on chiaroscuro than perspective, Constable's "naturalistic" school of painting sought to make a canvas as perfect an imitation as possible, accurately recording a retinal, almost photographic, impression. Constable's genius lay in his ability to surpass formulaic and technical approaches to painting, such as the "Claude-glass" (a polished copper mirror which made a scene appear more as it might in a canvas by Claude), and in his skill at transcending the rigidity of methodical schemata and technique, especially with regard to the innate attributes of oil paint on canvas. The lively one-to-one correspondence between scene and picture, unimpeded by the cultural codes of vision, was the aspiration and success of Constable's "art of truth."

However, the realism of direct imitation poses problems for landscape architectural design. Let us not forget how landscape architectural drawings precede the subject-matter, unlike Constable's which were derived from a pre-existing subject. Therefore, to draw a "scene" which is yet to be built is to reverse the direction of artistic production. Whereas a painter's picture is a representation of a scene as perceived, a landscape architectural picture is a representation of a scene imagined, and, in turn, the built landscape becomes a representation of that picture. Rosalind Krauss, in her essay "The Originality of the Avant-Garde," has explained how the Picturesque paintings of Rosa, Lorrain, and Gilpin were conceived as pictorial "copies" of nature, formulaic and therefore reproducible, which actually preceded how the "original," the landscape, was subsequently seen and understood. Gilpin, for example, wrote extensively about how to look at a landscape scene and observe the "effects" of foreground, distance, perspective and "roughness." In describing this, Krauss has written, "the priorness and repetition of pictures (were) necessary to the singularity
of the Picturesque," and the understanding and meaning derived from a particular landscape was "made possible only by a prior example"—a picture. Krauss is describing how pictures can affect the reception and understanding of a landscape, the basis of the Picturesque, but pictures can also work to affect the production and management of landscapes. Andrew Wyeth’s paintings, for example, have helped the aristocracy of Chester and Delaware Counties, Pennsylvania, form a regional landscape aesthetic which they (indirectly) employ to control the design and management of their estates. Furthermore, pictures can also be used to literally transform a landscape physically. The Red Books of Humphry Repton, for example, show the beautification of a series of rural landscapes through the use of "before and after" paintings of specific scenes. The logic of the picture plane determines the landscape composition, subtracting and adding earth, water, and vegetation to an existing "inferior" view. Both the existing and proposed views are compared or overlaid so that one might understand the precise nature of the transformation. Of course, many eighteenth-century landscapes were laid out as an arrangement and disposition of scenes. One might stroll through such a landscape catching glimpses and then fully composed views of scenes evocative of contemporary paintings. The moving bodies of the visitors themselves often provide the action necessary to complement the scene, now backdrop. The problem, however, with scenographic approaches to landscape architectural design is that they demand that the subject's primary mode of attention be visual and participatory. Vision is, of course, only one part of landscape experience; rarely is one’s full attention devoted to the aesthetics of sight. Landscape perception is more fully the result of an accumulation of incident, impression and detour, more like a rambling and unpredictable sequence of events than a contrived picture-show. Reduced to a scene, the pictorial landscape is often conceived in a manner remote from both the laws of its own constituency (the effects of time and ecological flows of energy for example) and from the experiencing subject (aspects of distraction and the tactile for example). The danger of pictorial representation lies in the designer making "pictures" as opposed to "landscapes," scenes and visual compositions based upon the illusionary logic of the picture plane, rather than upon the sensual arrangement of landscape form, replete with a fullness of spatial, temporal and material qualities.

However, there are other types of representation which are perhaps better able to articulate a greater sense of experience than the singularity of perspectival pictures. These representations deploy graphic signs and symbols which are rich with connotative value, unlike the strictly denotative symbol system used in notational drawing. Expression in representation works because of the way in which semantically rich symbols (marks, gestures, shapes, colors) can be related to metaphoric labels, figures that disclose an infinite network of associated meanings due to what Goodman has called their "semantic density." The experience of inference and association in art is called synthesia, which means the splashing over of impressions from one sense mode to another. For example, Kandinsky illustrated how shape and color, purely visual phenomena, could be juxtaposed so as "to weep," or "to shout" or to "kill each other." We speak of "loud colors," "bright sounds," or "cold light." It is the signifying capacity of a semantically rich representation which speaks to us, as in Duchamp's powerful Genre Allegory (George Washington), wherein the iodine-soaked bandages pinned to a canvas with military stars ironically recall a rather disordered American flag and also silhouette the distinctive facial profile of Washington.

While such highly suggestive works are clearly visual, they are not images. That is, they
do not directly resemble the optical image of things, the *image*, or the retinal specter, but rather they point to the *idea* which underlies things. In other words, the *cause* of a particular effect is shown. We may call this the archetypal essence of things: that which remains ever open to new interpretations. Drawing of this sort is therefore re-presentational; that
is, it does not simply represent a world already in existence, a quantity we already know, but rather it tries to re-present the world in ways previously unforeseen, thereby making the old appear new and the banal appear fresh. The fact that drawing in landscape architectural design precedes a built reality means that it might also have first to transform a society's vision about landscape, perhaps playing less on the picture and more on the phenomenological enigmas inherent in the landscape itself. To understand representation as (de)sign—as portent or harbinger—one must first learn to forget the scenic surface of the image and think behind it, beneath it, around it.  

THE MISUSE OF DRAWING

Projections, notations, and representations are all, though in differing ways, indirect, abstract, incongruous, and anterior in relation to the landscape medium. These qualities have led to two major misconceptions about the value and action of drawing in contemporary design. The first misuse occurs when emphasis is placed on the drawing itself, as if the drawing is the artistic and prized artifact. In this camp, the seductive qualities of drawing promote a detached and personal preoccupation with it, whereupon the drawing is over-privileged as an artform unto itself. It is commonplace today to see autonomous and self-referential drawings as bearers of effect and the focus of attention. Such works are eminently consumable, affording a visual feast for those with the appetite, while remaining ineffectual with regard to the actual production and experience of landscape. The wide availability of images and their mass dissemination has prompted John Whiteman to write:

First, in critical magazines, architecture becomes its own market, both producing and consuming its own images. Second, the ideology and impulses which then surround architectural drawing no longer aim toward the production of architectural experience, but instead lead to images that can only be picturesque in their hidden drive to be available for distribution.

The second misuse of drawing is a reaction against the former. This party is suspicious of any meaning a drawing may hold beyond that of the strictly instrumental. Consequently, the potential richness of drawing is suppressed through a reductive and overly technical practice. Here, the emphasis is on the mute language of objective, denotative systems (plans, sections, isometrics). An outcome of the eighteenth century, this scientific view of drawing is widely practiced today owing to the emphasis on rational methodology in the design professions and building trades. Moreover, as Whiteman has argued, the instrumental use of drawing has continued to gain greater currency because of the effects of modern criticism, which, like drawing, usually has its greatest impact prior to construction, but relies on the drawing, rather than the built artifact, to make its judgments—judgments made not only by professional peers but also by clients and other interest groups which can influence precisely what gets built. As Whiteman has pointed out, the problem lies in the fact that modern criticism seeks objectivity and remains suspicious of alternative symbolic systems of interpretation. Subsequently: "We get scared of the artistic power of architecture and distrust our capacity to notate and represent artistic intentions to ourselves. We are made nervous by the possibility that a commitment in symbolic form might be rendered naive. So we turn aside from a way of architecture which can reshape things to make meanings immediate and present to us. Instead we run to ideas and conceptions
which seem to have automatic justification for us." Furthermore, Whiteman has observed that: "Under the influence of pure criticism we have confused the separate purposes of representation and notation, and have inculcated an aesthetic in which simultaneity, immediacy and impact are the prized values. This involves a refutation of mimesis, and an attack on the notion of depth, by giving a rendering of the world in the flat."

While modern criticism may perhaps promote a more objective and unambiguous form of landscape and architectural depiction, other forms of criticism, such as deconstruction, for instance, or even contemporary art criticism, promote the other extreme of drawing described in the preceding paragraph, the mystical, "artistic" drawing. The problem in both the instrumental and the ethereal drawing is that the drawing itself becomes the focus of attention for criticism. Furthermore, as the critical view also tends to place distance between the critic and the object, in this case the drawing, the distance from the actual landscape is effectively doubled. Not only does an illusory picture plane stand between critic and landscape, but so too does a screen of "critical" schemata—a screen which is often just as sterile or obscure as the drawings to which it refers. Nothing could be more remote from the lived experience of landscape space. The motivations behind either form of drawing and criticism seem antithetical to the work of landscape architecture, inevitably constructing false ground for the justification of such work. Both the mystical "artist" and the pragmatic "technician" effectively sever any authentic dialogue the drawing may have with built experience and the material world, significantly misunderstanding the function of the drawing and building. In effect, the landscape medium becomes "contaminated" by the drawing; that is to say, the innate richness of the landscape itself is suppressed or suffocated by another medium which is either excessively privileged or significantly undervalued.

The source of this dichotomy lies in the fact that both the excessive and repressive uses of drawing are linked to drawing's apparent incongruity, or indirectness, in relation to landscape architecture; one camp revels in drawing's abstractness, while the other is repelled by the same level of abstraction. On the one side are those who insist on an irreducible expressiveness, on the other are those insisting on an objective "realism." As Robin Evans has observed: "The two options, one emphasizing the corporeal properties of things made, the other concentrating on the disembodied qualities in the drawing, are diametrically opposed: in the one corner, involvement, substantiality, tangibility, presence, immediacy, direct action: in the other, disengagement, obliqueness, abstraction, mediation, and action at a distance."

However, neither camp recognizes that landscape architectural drawing gains its potency precisely from its directness of application to landscape, on the one hand, and its disengaged, abstract qualities on the other. After all, it is just as erroneous to suggest that the designer's free imagination is the source of inventive form as it is to discuss drawing as the sole generator of formal creation. Rather, both play off one another, as in an engaging and probing conversation. How else are the leaps and abridgments between ideas and their embodiment in form made? Drawing is an eidetic medium, and to use it simply as a means to an end, or as a means of self-indulgence in the name of "artistic expression," is irresponsible with respect to the real work of landscape architecture. This suggests a difference between drawings used merely as tools of composition and communication, and drawings which act as vehicles of creativity. The emphasis shifts from drawing as image
to drawing as work or process, a creative act which is somehow analogous to the actual construing and constructing of built landscapes.\(^{48}\)

THE METAPHORICITY OF DRAWING

This essay began by describing drawing as a translatory medium which enabled the figuration of an imaginary idea into a visual/spatial corporeality embodied in the built fabric of the landscape. While the essay so far may have stressed the differences between the medium of drawing and the medium that constitutes the landscape, highlighting the limits of drawing in representing (and therefore designing for) landscape experience, there still remain properties of drawing that make it an extraordinarily powerful medium in relation to the production of landscapes. The dilemma of both the ethereal and instrumental drawing, so prevalent today can be resolved when drawing is understood at the locus of reconciliation between construal and construction, or between symbolic and instrumental representations.\(^ {49}\) For example, the original Vitruvian "ideas" as embodied in drawing suggest that drawings hold the possibility of being both projective, notational, and representational at the same time. Neither images nor pictures, such drawings are analogical demonstrations of both construal and construction. They are the architecture, embodying the symbolic intentions of the building and demonstrating its construction.

A more significant type of drawing in landscape architectural design might arise from a twofold use of the graphic medium: one is the speculative function, and the other is the demonstrative function. In the first, drawing is used as a vehicle of creativity, and in the second, drawing is used as a vehicle of realization. Both types of drawing work by analogy and occur alongside one another simultaneously.

As a vehicle of creativity, drawing is a highly imaginative and speculative activity, entailing both spontaneity and reflection. It first involves the making of marks and the "seeing" of possibilities. Such work is both imaginal and theoretical, making images and recording spatial and tactile qualities through a process of association, akin to what was said earlier about Kandinsky and the power of synesthesia. For example, in the Chinese and Japanese technique of "flung-ink" painting, originating as early as the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, ink is first thrown onto the canvas in an energetically random manner to form a visual field. The painter then improvises through immediate response to the thrown image and beings to construct a landscape through the working of the brush. Alexander Cozens developed a similar approach of responsive drawing during the eighteenth century in England. In such improvisational, rapid-response work, the graphic field is deeply inhabited by all the visceral and imaginative capacities of the artist striving to see, to draw out and to bring-into-being.

The flung-ink (although it could be any graphic medium, some much richer such as tempera or oil paints) begins the process by opening up a synesthetic "field," a metaphorically suggestive realm that prompts an imaginative seeing. Leonardo da Vinci had once said that one first truly learns to see by allowing one's attention to become absorbed in streaks of dried spittle or the surface of an old stained wall until the imagination is able to distinguish an alternative world.\(^ {50}\) Seventeenth-century artists Johann Konig and Antonio Carracci used the suggestive fields of veined marbles and agates as the basis for highly imaginative paintings of landscapes and other representations. Figures and images were literally drawn out
and metamorphosed from the surfaces of stone and minerals. Similarly, the making of graphic and collage fields "irritate" the mental faculties to such a degree that fountains of possibilities emerge before the percipient; one becomes so engaged with the wealth of images that new worlds are disclosed, as if in a dream or hallucination. Like the luminous collages of Schwitters or Ernst, these fields of interpretation make impressions on the receptive mind and, in turn, the imagination impresses itself into the field. Fresh images might be conjured up as one "sees" things in new associations. As the Surrealists have already shown the power of a physically inhabited and synesthetic realm can re-enchant the ordinary and make the everyday world magical once again.

The tactics of appropriation, collage, abstraction, imaginative projection, and so on, are strategies used to prompt free association, providing liberatory mechanisms of construal. However, such work first requires that the drawing be theoretically and critically motivated by the maker. Collage, for example, is not a random and unfocused activity, but demands a highly disciplined and reflective mind. It is not simply a matter of "anything goes." Any creative transformation that results from human intellection will always entail special vocabularies, procedures and modes of demonstration specific to a particular theorem and motive. The game is complex, elusive, unsystematic, and ever subject to modification. It is important to remember that these types of drawing are only strategies; their primary work is in critical response to something. They are neither automatic divination screens, yielding up ideas of their own making, nor are they grounds of justification, falsely legitimizing the project simply because of their perceived magic. The function of abstraction in drawing is simply to discover new ground, to gain insight, not to obfuscate, nor to justify a project.

The difficulty in such drawing lies in distinguishing the culturally and architecturally relevant from the limits of personal fancy or those of more transient value. The percipient must be able to distinguish between weak, fanciful ideas and the more potent images and symbolic structures relevant to landscape architectural experience. Ideas such as archetype, deep structure, and the constancy of the primary or typical human condition, belie the fact that there are universally significant situations peculiar to the human condition. Essentially, a significant "seeing" is about re-cognition, and remains the outcome of productive and meaningful poetic activity. Drawing can best function in this capacity if two tenets are first upheld: first, drawings are eidetic phenomena which work through symbols and analogues, not through likeness of representation. This point is illustrated by Frascari, who equates graphic and constructed angles with "angels." In describing the journeys of the early Mediterranean sailors, Frascari has written:

The imagining of angels, building essences, was a way of finding the angles necessary to determine the direction for reaching land safely. In architecture this traditional charisma of angels and angles is recorded, in an oblique way, by Vitruvius. In his explanation of the planning of the angles of cities, Vitruvius cites as an example the Tower of Winds in Athens. This hellenistic edifice incorporates both representations of the winds as figures of angels and as the angles of direction.

Later, he concludes: "the objects of architecture should not be given to public knowledge in a rigid, finished state, in their naked 'as suchness.' Rather, they should be presented as demonstrations in such a way that each angle should be dressed up as an angel."
For Frascari then, the instrumental and the symbolic (or visible and the invisible), are united through analogies between the signifier and the signified. The degree of reciprocity between both the signifier and the signified thus forms a second tenet of drawing. John Whiteman has referred to this correspondence as a "qualitative precision" between the symbols used in representation and the ideas they embody in built landscape form. He has written: "(An understanding of the terms qualitative precision) means admitting that the logics of formal manipulation cannot be purely autonomous, but judgements in architectural
design are guided not by the autonomous reasons of form alone but rather by a coupled sense of the physical and the symbolized, the visible and the invisible.\(^{56}\)

A more laconic and accurate form of drawing might best be realized by the individual with time and experience, as one can only properly understand the interrelationships between the symbolic and the material worlds more through sensible observation than by secondary constructs such as concepts and analytical matrices. However, the qualitative precision of angles and angels is not simply a case of observational clarity (which is something always susceptible to scientific prescription and duplication), but more properly derives from imaginative construal. The paradox inherent in the term "qualitative precision" is that accuracy of observation belongs not to scientific certainty but to the realm of myth and poetry wherein things make sense and ring true without necessarily being explicit or accountable. It is in this way that symbols retain their open-endedness and are subject to ever richer association.

Speculation through drawing is, however, only part of drawings full function with respect to landscape architectural production. A necessary complement lies in drawings' capacity to demonstrate intention and construction—the drawing as a vehicle of realization. This type of drawing goes beyond speculative fields (and the emergence of ideas), and instead it begins to demonstrate the project in practical terms. In describing the drawings of two contemporary architects, Carlo Scarpa and Mario Ridolfi, Fascari has written:

Scarpa works out his strata of architectural mediations on pieces of Bristol board with overlays of light pieces of tracing paper, using drafting and colored pencils, diluted inks and applying the painterly technique of pentimenti. Ridolfi utilizes layers of heavy tracing paper for his analogical thinking, employing a fountain pen, and editing the final drawing with a skilful use of scissors and transparent adhesive tape. Scarpa's and Ridolfi's drawings... are visual descriptions of processes that are not visible. They are conceived not to be read by the public, but to carry out a demonstration of intent. On the other hand, conventional working drawings are scientific tools for presenting a future reality within an appearance of continuous and uniform order; they show a result, not the intent.\(^{51}\)

The dynamic drawings of Scarpa and Ridolfi are "productive representations of an eidetic process,"\(^{58}\) the result of analogically working the medium of drawing with the medium of building. Scarpa, for example, scores his paper with a plan delineation of the particular site and its physical context. Layers are then added and subtracted orthographically, as if alternately building and partly demolishing foundations. Scales are shifted and overlaid as parts and details are played alongside the construal of the whole. The drawings are made neither for construction nor presentation, but rather for the disciplined work found in these ideational drawings, enabling the ideas to be translated into built form. The representation of space is not separated from the space of representation, just as the function of representation is not separated from the representation of function.

A common aspect of both the speculative and the demonstrative drawing is that they each act as vehicles for creativity, as intermediary catalysts that are used to generate a landscape architectural project. Never are they merely descriptive on the one hand, nor decorative and fetishistic on the other. Rather, they both belong to a kind of work called deixis. In describing deixis, Norman Bryson has explained how the term originally derives from deikononei, meaning "to show," to make evident, and that in linguistics the term deictic is
applied to utterances that supply information regarding the source of utterance. Deictic tenses are always compounds of the present, the here and now, and stand in contrast to aoristic tenses which are past and imperfect, and belong characteristicly to the historian, "reciting the events of the past impersonally and without reference to his/her own position." 

In further describing deixis, Norman Bryson has written: "The wider class of deixis there-
fore includes all those particles and forms of speech where the utterance incorporates into itself information about its own spatial position relative to its content (here, there, near, far), and to its own relative temporality (yesterday, today, tomorrow, sooner, later, long ago). Deixis is utterance in carnal form and speaks back directly to the body of the speaker."

In relationship to painting, Bryson has elaborated on deixis by discussing the making of Chinese and Japanese flung-ink paintings. While landscape is clearly the focus of attention in these canvases, equally so is the spontaneous work of the brush in "real," or processual, time. Bryson has written: "The work of production is constantly displayed in the wake of its traces; in this tradition the body of labor is on constant display, just as it is judged in terms which, in the West, would only apply to a performing art.""}

The imaginal is both enacted and constructed in a radically temporal and dynamic sequence of painterly responses. The action of seeing and marking does not attempt to conceal its own evolvement, mistaken attempts and all. Instead, the paintings deictically play out and express their own construal, like a performance which maps out its own body. This is in contrast to "the image that suppresses deixis," the image that "has no interest in its own genesis or past, except to bury it in a palimpsest in which only the final versions show through above an interminable debris of revisions.... (Here) the existence of the image in its own time, of duration, of practice, of the body, is negated by never referring the marks on canvas to their place in the vanished sequence of local aspirations." The deictic drawing, meanwhile, records and traces its own evolution, and refers back to an entire corpus
of prior thoughts, ideas, and associations. Deixis both marks and realizes the moment at which construal becomes construction.

CONCLUSION

Research into the development of projection, notation, and representation vis-a-vis the effective and artful construal, construction, and sustenance of built landscape form has still yet to occur in a vibrant and imaginative way. This research might begin through an increased understanding of the mechanisms of analogy and metaphor in both speculative and demonstrative drawing. Analogical drawing looks for some form of interaction and dialogue between the symbolic realms of ideas and meaning and the structures of projection and embodiment. In this way, the drawing is an integral part of the landscape "project," holding within its deictic traces the symbolic and instrumental intentions of the scheme. Such drawings might not only tell us what things might be but also what they are like, suggesting, without necessarily prescribing quite specific settings and topologies. Plans, sections, notation scores, scale shifts, light and texture studies, and so on, are drawn alongside the speculative play of the collagic field, actively plotting landscape relationships between the idea and construction. While the focus of attention shifts from normative modes of perception to a more liberating discovery of intertextuality between things, a precision of intent and demonstration thereof is still demanded. Analogical thinking is both intuitive and rational, and must play subjective sensibilities off and against systems of order and measure.

Metaphorical/analogical drawing is thus radically different from analytical drawing, which is more instrumental and calculative than it is poetic and imaginative. The generative free-play of metaphorical and deictic drawing, in dialogue with the discipline of notation and projection, is a critical and speculative practice that demonstrates the chiasm of a landscape's construal and construction. Rich with significance and interpretative ambiguity, landscape architectural drawing as a synesthetic and commutative medium might better afford a richer realization of ideas within the built environment. Such a drawing is less a finished "work of art," and even less a tool for communicating instrumental ideas, than it is itself a catalytic locale of inventive subterfuges for the making of poetic landscapes. In essence, the drawing is a plot, necessarily strategic, map-like, and acted out.

LANDSCAPE AS CULTURAL PRODUCT (1984)
DENIS COSGROVE

[The key to the modern landscape idea and its development lies in the] dual significance of land during the struggles to redefine it. In a natural economy the relationship between human beings and land is dominantly that of the insider, an unalienated relationship based on use values and interpreted analogically. In a capitalist economy it is a relationship between owner and commodity, an alienated relationship wherein man stands as outsider
and interprets nature causally. Culturally, a degree of alienation is achieved by compositional techniques—particularly linear perspective, the formal structure of the pastoral in poetry and drama and the conventional language of landscape appreciation. The idea of landscape holds both types of relationship in an unstable unity, forever threatening to lapse into either the unreflexive subjectivism of the insider where the feeling for the land is incom- municable through the artificial languages of art; or the objectification of land as property pure and simple, the outsider's view, where alienation is complete and a statistical weighting can be placed upon the "landscape value" of a piece of land which can be entered into a cost/benefit analysis against the value that the land might have as an industrial site. The origin of the landscape idea in the West and its artistic expressions have served in part to promote ideologically an acceptance of the property relationship while sustaining the image of an unalienated one, of land as use. The history of the landscape idea is one of artistic and literary exploration of the tensions within it until, with the hegemonic establishment of urban industrial capitalism and the bourgeois culture of property, landscape lost its artistic and moral force and became a residual in cultural production regarded either as an element of purely individual subjectivity or the scientifically defined object of academic study, particularly in geography. The ambiguity in landscape between individual and social meaning may be understood as an alternative way of articulating the same tensions, but at the level of human relationships, of self and community, rather than human life and land....

As an active force in cultural production landscape atrophied in the late nineteenth century. With the secure establishment of industrial capitalism the relationship it had long posited of a separation of individual from land and its private, personal consumption through sight, had become a way of being, experienced in urban life, intellectually defended in science and promoted in education while endlessly reinforced by the stream of visual images set before our eyes. Landscape, for all its appeal, cannot mediate the experience of the active insider and the passive outsider, as Ruskin discovered. Geographers who proclaim a human landscape concept need to recognize this as a point of departure, not a problem to be overcome, but a contradiction to be explored in its various contexts. Commenting on the writing of one of England's greatest landscape novelists, Thomas Hardy—amateur landscape painter and creator of the enduring image of Wessex—John Barrell\(^1\) has stressed the impossibility of capturing "the simultaneous presence of someone within the centre of knowledge ... and his absence from it, in a position from which he observes but does not participate." Such a feat is doubly impossible with the landscape idea: it originated as the outsider's perspective, it remains a controlling composition of the land rather than its mirror. Therefore, \textit{Landscapes can be deceptive.}

\textit{Sometimes a landscape seems to be less a setting for the life of its inhabitants than a curtain behind which their struggles, achievements and accidents take place. For those who, with the inhabitants, are behind the curtains, landmarks are no longer geographic but also biographical and personal.} \(^2\)
I am particularly interested in defining and establishing a theory for the built landscape between the dominant binary categories of many texts on modern design. In particular, I realize that we must alter the marginal role landscape architecture has been assigned in the histories of modernity. As a field that built physical critiques of, and in, the American city that embodied broader society's unquestioning acceptance of industrialization and technological progress, landscape architecture has not fit within the descriptive, evaluative, and interpretive categories of mainstream modernism—historical or theoretical. As such, its contributions to culture and society have either not been recognized or have been misinterpreted and maligned. Landscape architects are only now coming to terms with this deficit and its implications for designers and planners.

My research methods and interpretive strategies for theory-making as a feminist landscape architect can be characterized as follows:

1. Interpretations of built works and treatises should be based on primary experiences that are mediated through the knowledge of historical situations. This primary experience has two forms—visiting a site; and studying historical plans, maps, treatises, journals, letters, photographs, and the like.

For example, to understand the topographic form and hydrologic systems that structure the Emerald Necklace park system, a student of the Olmsted firm's project must study more than the 1894 plan. That engraving depicts streets, water bodies, plantations of trees, and meadows, but no topography. The site appears flat. The shapes and locations of the various "beads" along the Necklace seem arbitrary—or informal and unstructured. After studying the landforms of the park system through grading plans of the period and contemporary U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) maps of Boston, one discerns repeated landforms, such as drumlins and eskers, that characterized this glaciated terrain. The alignment of the Necklace is not irregular; it maximizes the diversity of landscape types that characterize New England. The alignment of the Necklace and the undulations of the land within its boundaries speak of the structure of the land.

A walk along the seven-mile transect from Franklin Park, the country park, to the Public Garden and the Boston Common is an excellent way to assemble the information found in nineteenth-century maps, plans, and reports into a coherent spatial narrative. This walk, too, must be mediated by comparing historic photographs with contemporary appearances, because the growth and decline of vegetation, and the modification of adjacent roadways, have altered the connections between the "beads,"

2. We should be suspect of the generalizations that "transcend the boundaries of culture and region." Instead, theoretical work should be contingent, particular, and situated. Grounding in the immediate, the particular, and the circumstantial—the attributes of situational criticism—is an essential characteristic of landscape architectural design and theory. Landscape theory must rely on the specific, not the general; and like situational and feminist criticism landscape architectural design and theory must be based on observation, on what is known through experience, on the immediate and sensory—what is known by
all the senses, not only the eye. Thus, landscape architectural theory is situational; it is explicitly historical, contingent, pragmatic, and ad hoc. It is not about idealist or absolute universals. It finds meaning, form, and structure in the site as it is. The landscape does not sit silent awaiting the arrival of an architectural subject. The site—and land—speaks prior to the act of design.

Earlier I described Prospect Park as a landscape design that applied the abstract conceptual language of nineteenth-century aesthetic theory—the Beautiful or Pastoral, the Picturesque, and the Sublime—to the particular conditions of a tract of land in Brooklyn. The circumstances of the site—its location at the boundary between glaciated and nonglaciated landforms—suggested the most fitting place for each of the aesthetic characters to be developed.

Bos Park in Amsterdam provides another example of how built landscapes should be situated prior to, and through, theoretical interpretation. The location of Bos Park on a polder encourages us to look closely at the section of the park. Height above sea level is the critical dimension in the design; the section, not the plan, is key in describing the structure of the existing land and the design response to it.

3. We should be skeptical of discourses that assign a gender affiliation to the landscape—implicitly or explicitly. The implicit affiliations are manifest as "female"—the "other" who is seen but not heard. Hitchcock's writing on the modern garden, noted earlier, is an example of this. The ideal modern house is surrounded by sylvan nature that merely frames the building. Nature is the neutral backdrop. The explicit affiliations are manifest as "feminine"—that which is irrational, wild, chaotic, emotional, natural. The site descriptions of Duany and Plater-Zyberk are examples of this, as any landscape element that alters the town plan grid is considered awkward or distorting. There are not two structures on the site, only one—that of Euclidean geometry.

4. While the deconstruction of the discourses that relegate landscape to a silent female or irrational feminine role in modernism is necessary, it is not enough. We need to reconstruct the unheard languages of the modern landscape as a means to reinvigorate contemporary design practice. The work of a feminist design critic is reconstructive, not destructive. This reconstruction assumes a multilayered fabric that weaves together threads from primary sources and documents written by landscape architects and about landscape architecture with the concurrent history of ecological ideas, cultural and historical geography, design and planning criticism, and site interpretation.

We must do more than note how badly served landscape architecture is by descriptions that rely solely on architectural categories and concepts. Scholars' research into the history of modern landscape architecture must question what has been lost when landscape design components are overlooked. As noted in the earlier interpretation of Radburn, by ignoring the project's planting plan and the contributions of Cautley, the social spaces of the neighborhood were misunderstood by historians and practitioners. The role of trees and hedges as spatial subdivisions between the public and private realms was ignored, and the result was that the many projects that supposedly emulated Radburn were characterized by amorphous open space. Contemporary residential life, as well as an accurate history, suffered from this incomplete reading.

5. Finally, landscape architectural history has been, for the most part, a masculine discourse focusing on the works of great landscape architects—mostly men. The history of modernity has especially concentrated on the autonomy of these artistic works, their formal attributes, and their plan configurations. This historiography must be enhanced and challenged, for it denies the conditions of practice, conceptualization, and experience. This chal-
challenges exposes landscape history as a fiction that has been written through a particular lens or sensibility that has ideological implications. By challenging the "formulation of the crucial questions of the discipline as a whole," I am following in the footsteps of scholars such as Griselda Pollock and Linda Nochlin, whose writings have enriched the histories of modern art. To paraphrase Pollock, a dual role for feminist landscape architectural history and theory—"recovery of women producers" and "deconstruction of the discourses and practices of [architectural] history itself"—is a positive act of construction, not destruction.

For landscape architectural history and theory, this translates into more than research on the many women designers whose careers were ignored by such scholars as landscape historian Norman Newton. Scholars must also reconsider the methodologies of prior histories to ascertain whether or not they precluded some works from entering into the canon. Scholars and students must determine whether a history comprised of monographs on individual designers and their works allows for the consideration of the complexity of collaborative work in a corporate practice. How does one chronicle the works of Sasaki Associates, the SWA Group, or EDAW, for instance—three firms whose employees move in and out of the practice over time? We must discuss whether landscape architecture's quest for status as a profession and discipline on par with that of architecture resulted in the repression of more horticulturally focused designs and designers. We should wonder about the lack of contextual site plans and urban plans in our histories, which limit our ability to interpret built landscapes as more than great works or objects. Shouldn't landscape architectural history and theory attempt to uncover the interrelationships between a project and its surroundings? If we believe it is important for students to know something about the history of architecture as well as landscape architecture, shouldn't they also know something about the emergence of ecological thinking, especially during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries?

One goal of scholarship, therefore, is to construct legitimate alternatives to the limiting binary terms that modern society has adopted to describe relationships between landscape and architecture, nature and culture, female and male, nature and man. In place of such oppositional binaries, we need conceptual quaternary fields such as those I have proposed for figure and field, man and nature. These expanded fields are defined by concepts—such as the figured ground, articulated space, the minimal garden, and landscapes for architecture—with complex, not simple, relationships to one another. The scholar can develop theories for site description and interpretation that occupy the space between nature and culture, landscape and architecture, man-made and natural, and that are along the spatial continuum that unites, not the solid line that divides, concepts in binary opposites.

This realm of inclusions will reposition the landscape from "other" to "ground." Andreas Huyssen's essay "Mapping the Postmodern" may offer direction here. He proposes that "in an important section of our culture there has been an important shift in sensibilities, practices and discourse formations which distinguishes a postmodern set of assumptions, experiences and propositions from that of the preceding period." He continues by arguing that postmodernism has not "generated genuinely new aesthetic forms," but rather has continued to employ modernity's forms "reinscrib[ing] them into an altered cultural context." Huyssen lists the environment and ecology—along with the culture of women, minorities, and non-Westerners—as the grounds upon which modernity's forms are reinscribed. Huyssen's procedure for reinscription connotes an image of intersections, overlaps, hybrids, and cyborgs that are created only by acknowledging that two terms of elements can relate to one another without implied hierarchies or dominances—without